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Sunday, March 10, 2024

I, Soldier - part 35

The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant was a particularly depressing day for me. I became convinced that no new nuclear power plants would be built, and the existing ones would be shut down eventually. Something similar happened to warplanes for a while after Billy Mitchell proved it was possible to sink a battleship with a bomb or torpedo dropped from an airplane. Love for battleships was deeply ingrained in the Navy at the time, and instead of being rewarded for his innovation, Mitchell was court-martialed on trumped-up charges of insubordination.  

As I researched US military history and reminisced on my time in the Army, the same pattern emerged over and over. It was the way bureaucratic concerns and entrenched interests stood in the way of innovation and common sense. One of the things that cheered me was reading Army manuals written by men who were also interested in reform. In an Army manual on the use of military intelligence, I found the following:

***
At the outset of the Spanish-American War, Colonel Arthur L. Wagner was head of the Military Information Division (the War Department’s embryonic intelligence organization). Driven by public sentiment, President McKinley and Secretary of War Russell A. Alger were determined to attack Spanish forces in Cuba not later than summer 1898. Wagner at once prepared a careful assessment of the Spanish forces, terrain, climate and environmental conditions in Cuba—the basic intelligence needed for operational planning. Wagner’s assessment also identified recurring outbreaks of yellow fever in Cuba during the summer months as a crucial planning consideration. At a White House meeting, Wagner recommended postponement of any invasion until the winter months in order to reduce what would otherwise be heavy American losses from the disease. President McKinley reluctantly endorsed his view. As they left the meeting, Secretary of War Alger was furious with Colonel Wagner. “You have made it impossible for my plan of campaign to be carried out,” he told Wagner. “I will see to it that you do not receive any promotions in the Army in the future.” 

The Secretary of War made good on his promise, for although Colonel Wagner was promoted years later to brigadier general, the notice of his appointment reached him on his death bed. Furthermore, Alger influenced McKinley to reauthorize a summer invasion of Cuba. Fortunately, United States forces won a quick victory, but as Wagner predicted, the effects of disease soon devastated the force. The ravages of yellow fever, typhoid, malaria and dysentery accounted for more than 85 percent of total casualties and were so severe that by August 1898 less than one quarter of the invasion force remained fit for service. According to his peers, Wagner deliberately jeopardized his career in order to satisfy a sense of duty, rather than bow to political pressure. Information that American lives could be saved by avoiding the worst time of the year for yellow fever was more important to him than currying favor with the Secretary of War. 
***

I was moved by the integrity of Colonel Wagner's actions. It made me wonder how many times Colonel Truman faced similar dilemmas in his career. During my time in Vietnam, the military intelligence reports I received from others, whose names I rarely learned, were crucial to my decision-making. Military intelligence might be everyone's favorite oxymoron, but for me, it was a matter of life or death. I called Trautman and asked if he remembered the names of anyone who helped prepare reports for me, because I wanted to send letters of thanks to all of them. He gave me a few names, I wrote the letters, but only got one response. It read:

***
Your letter came as a welcome surprise. I had begun to doubt whether I had done anything worthwhile during the war. Maybe someday when the memorial is complete, we can visit it together.
***

I had read a bit about the planned Vietnam War Memorial. It was supposed to be a simple black wall with the names of all 58,000 American troops who died there. It seemed a bit ugly to me. A war memorial that size should at least have a flag and a statue. 

My favorite soldier from the Vietnam War was Specialist Minnock. I never met him, but I read about him. He was a signals intelligence analyst. Through his work, he became convinced the enemy would attack at a certain place and time. Because of his low rank, he feared he would not be believed by his South Vietnamese counterpart, so he impersonated a US Army captain when he gave his presentation. The ruse worked, his advice was followed, and the predicted attack was repulsed with minimal friendly casualties. 

One night, after Alexandra came home, she asked me what I thought about the wall.

"It's an odd situation, my dear. I sort of understand now how Confederate veterans must have felt about the memorials set up for them. That is, it's a nice gesture, but doesn't undo the damage of the defeat, and the pain of being on the losing side. Still, it's important that we have such reminders of the risks of war."

"What do you think about Confederate flags and monuments?"

"I grew up seeing them all the time, so for me, they're just a bit of history. It's like seeing a picture of the pyramids in Egypt. The only emotion I feel is curiosity for a bygone era. There were surely Egyptians centuries after the pyramids were built who wanted them demolished. Many ancient monuments have been defaced in Egypt and elsewhere over the centuries. That doesn't make it right, though."

"What if people want them removed because they don't like them or think they're hateful?"

"Emotions are always valid, even if the reasons for them aren't. People are free to dislike things and petition to have them removed or demolished. I think there's a lot to be said for leaving history out in the open where everyone can see it. It's like having lots of little museums everywhere."

"Lots of offensive things get banned, censored, or regulated. It's still illegal to swear on broadcast TV and that's enforced with fines."

"Yes, but Fahrenheit 451 and 1984 are not an instruction manuals nor should they be. The FCC should stick with regulating the electromagnetic spectrum. It's a classic case of mission creep. It's the same reason the feds went after marijuana after Prohibition ended."

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