He notes that the Asian soldiers in those wars had a preference for camouflage, tunneling, crawling, bayonets, concussion grenades, and night attacks. A specific example is the way the Vietcong repeatedly penetrated US bases and disguised the raid as a lucky strike from a mortar attack. The sound of concussion grenades can easily be confused for a mortar strike, especially at night.
The only glaring mistake I noticed in the book (published in 2001) is that he predicted that laser weapons would become the norm even for infantry in the 21st century. Lasers have many fatal flaws such as size, expense, and fragility that make them impractical for combat. Unfortunately, this has not stopped funding for the development of such systems.
Based on the preferences of the American public and its leaders, it's very unlikely the US will ever fight another conventional war especially against a near peer like Russia or China, or even a much weaker foe like North Korea.
A greater emphasis on night training could be useful, though given the increased danger, it is often avoided. Even so, the Night Infiltration Course has been a standard part of US Army basic training for decades.
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The Ribbon Creek incident occurred on the night of April 8, 1956, when Staff Sergeant Matthew McKeon, a junior drill instructor at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina, marched his assigned platoon into Ribbon Creek, a swampy tidal creek. The incident resulted in the deaths of six United States Marine Corps recruits. McKeon was found guilty of possession and drinking alcohol on duty and of negligent homicide.
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The US military often claims to "own the night" because of technology like night vision, but it seems its adversaries got on well enough without such technology. The focus on improving lethality is a mistake. The emphasis should be on improving the basic infantry skills of squads and platoons. As much as possible, they should try to imitate the way the VC and similar adversaries fought.
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