I found this while trying to find the NSA Beer Policy of 1970. NSA employees used to be able to buy beer from the cafeteria vending machines at Fort Meade.
Apologies for the text color. I had trouble adjusting it.
The sources for this post:
Uncle Sam and his 40,000 snoopers (cryptome.org)
U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir (cryptome.org)
From an interview in the 70s with Perry Fellwock, who later became an NSA whistleblower:
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Do the Russians know about the NSA listening into them?
-They regularly wish NSA interception stations a merry christmas.
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On to the subs...
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Q. You have explained how we are able to monitor Soviet air traffic to the extent indicated, but it's hard to believe that we could know where all their missile submarines are at any given moment.
A. Maybe so, but that's the way it is. There are some basic ways in which we can keep track of them, for example through the interpretation of their sub-to-base signals which they encode and transmit in bursts that last a fraction of a second. First we record it on giant tape drops several feet apart, where it is played back slowly so that we get the signal clearly. Then the signal will be modulated -- that is, broken down so we can understand it. Then the codes are broken and we get the message, which often turns out to contain information allowing us to tell where they are.
Another way in which we keep track of these subs is much simpler. Often they'll surface someplace and send a weather message.
Q. But don't submarines go for long periods without communicating, maneuvering according to some pre-arranged schedule?
A. Actually, not very often. There are times during a war exercise or communications exercise when they might not transmit for a week or even longer. But we still keep track of them. We've discovered that they're like all Soviet ships in that they travel in patterns. By performing a very complicated, computerized pattern analysis, we are able to know where to look for a particular ship if it doesn't turn up for a while. The idea is that they revert from that pattern only in extreme emergency situation: but during such a situation they'll have to be in communication at least once. We know how many subs they have. And in practical terms, when one of them is not located, NSA units tasked with submarine detection concentrate all their energies on finding it.
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If Soviet subs could be located this easily, I'd expect US and Chinese subs to be equally vulnerable. This is just another nail in the coffin for the whole idea of using subs for nuclear deterrence. The only reason to use subs is that there are supposed to be hard for the enemy to find.
The Chinese and Russians don't need to break the codes US subs use; they merely need to use basic direction-finding techniques. What makes their work is easier is the fact that at any given time, about 40% of the US submarine force is idle awaiting repairs or in a repair depot. Russia and China also have spy satellites to make sub hunting easier.
table of idle subs: 260 (congress.gov)
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